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I. INTRODUCTION

Much of the recent commentary on the Confrontation Clause focuses on
the past. Commentators (and Supreme Court Justices) evaluate the evolving
jurisprudence by comparing the confrontation right articulated in Crawford v.
Washington and its progeny to the right that existed in 1791. 1 This Essay shifts
the focus to the future, exploring how the Supreme Court's new Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence will operate in a world where communication is
increasingly informal and electronic.
A large and increasing portion of our social discourse takes place
electronically, through email and texting, as well as on social media Internet
sites such as Facebook and Twitter. 2 These communications are particularly

• Associate Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. This Essay arose from the author's
presentation at the 2012 Criminal Law Symposium at the Texas Tech University School of Law. Thanks to
Arnold Loewy and the Texas Tech Law Review for their invitation to be a part of the Symposium and their
warm hospitality. For much more abbreviated commentary on this and related topics, follow the author on
Twitter: @BellinJ
I. See, e.g. , Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,46 (2004)(highlighting 1791 as the date the Sixth
Amendment was ratified); Ellen Liang Y ee, Forfeiture ofthe Confrontation Right in Giles: Justice Scalia 's
Faint-Hearted Fidelity to the Common Law, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1495, 1515 & n.115 (2010)
(discussing the historical record in 179 I but noting argument that the relevant time period was actually 1868
when the right was applied to the states by ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment).
2. See Joseph Goldstein, In Social Media Postings, a Trove for Investigators, N.Y. TiMES (Mar. 2,
20 II), http://www .nytimes.corn/20 11103/03/nyregion/03 facebook.html?_ r=O.
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susceptible to use in litigation. 3 Unlike oral communication, and even much of
traditional written discourse, electronic communications are difficult to keep
private because (1) they are often broadcast to multiple recipients; (2) they
reside (or pass through) computer servers owned and operated by third parties;
and (3) they are generally preserved, sometimes indefinitely, on the computers
involved in their creation and transmission. 4 As a consequence, this form of
evidence can be discovered long after its creation by savvy investigators and
presented to a jury in its original, and thus uniquely compelling, form.
Interestingly, the expanding category of electronic out-of-court statements
seems to be left, after Crawford and Michigan v. Bryant, largely unrestricted by
the Confrontation Clause. 5 A modem-day Sir Walter Raleigh incriminated by
an associate's emails, texts, or Facebook "status updates" will have his pleas for
confrontation dismissed out of hand by a court faithfully applying the Supreme
Court's recent case law. This is true regardless of doubts about the reliability of
the e-hearsay accusations offered by the prosecution or the absence of any
opportunity for cross-examination. Under Crawford and its progeny, the
confrontation right only applies to "testimonial" hearsay-that is, as the Bryant
Court defines the term, hearsay "procured with a primary purpose of creating an
out-of-court substitute for trial testimony."6 The post-Crawford Confrontation
Clause has "no application" to "nontestimonial" statements "even if they lack
indicia ofreliability."7 Excepting the rare occasions when people text, email, or
instant message (IM) their observations to law enforcement officials, few
electronic utterances appear to fall within the Court's definition of
"testimonial. " 8 This means that, as far as the modern Confrontation Clause is
concerned, and assuming a compliant hearsay exception, electronic
communications-the bulk of out-of-court communication in an increasingly
digital age--can be introduced by the prosecution in criminal cases without
confrontation.
This Essay articulates the case that the post-Crawford Confrontation
Clause doctrine renders the confrontation right surprisingly inconsequential in
an age of casual, electronic discourse and briefly explores a handful of reform
proposals that could alter this disquieting reality: ( 1) broadening the definition
of testimonial to include any statement that could reasonably be anticipated to
3. See id.
4. See Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twiller, and the Uncertain Future ofPresent Sense Impressions, 160
U. PA. L. REv. 331, 355-56 & nn.90-91 (2012) [hereinafter Bellin, Present Sense Impressions] .
5. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
6. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (explaining that statements are nontestimonial and not subject to the
Confrontation Clause if they are "not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute
for trial testimony").
7. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007).
8. See, e.g., Lisa Respers France, Police Departments Keeping Public Informed on Twitter, CNN
(Mar. 13, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-03-13/techlpolice.social.networking_l_twitter-and-facebooktwitter-user-departrnents?_s=PM:TECH; see also Dallas Police Department, FACEBOOK, http://www.
facebook.com/DallasPD (last visited Oct. 18, 20 12) (demonstrating that law enforcement agencies maintain a
presence on Facebook and Twitter).
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be used at trial; (2) reintroducing limits on the admission of nontestimonial
hearsay, either by (2a) reintroducing a Roberts-type reliability screen or (2b)
requiring a showing of unavailability prior to the admission of a declarant's
non testimonial hearsay; and (3) leaving the Confrontation Clause doctrine as is
and policing the admission of unreliable nontestimonial hearsay through the
Due Process Clause.

II. A NEW AGE OF COMMUNICATION
A new age of electronic communication is upon us. 9 Status updates,
tweets, emails, and texts are steadily replacing written letters, water cooler
gossip, phone calls, and voicemail. 10 The continued miniaturization of
computing power, along with the increasing availability of wireless
communication networks, has created a world in which people can (and do)
communicate at all times of the day, and from any location, to virtually anyone
and everyone on earth. 11 It may be true that a tree falling in the middle of a
deserted forest does not make a sound, but if the tree is under forty, it probably
has a smartphone 12 and can broadcast its predicament instantly with a "status
update" on Facebook:
Just fell in the forest. Anyone around? CLAB! 13
The new age of electronic communication is fostered by social media sites
such as Facebook and Twitter. 14 These Internet sites form the indispensable
infrastructure for mass electronic communication, allowing users to effortlessly

9. Cf ERIK QUALMAN, SOCIALNOMICS: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA TRANSFORMS THE WAY WE LIVE AND
Do BUSINESS xxi (2011) (stating that "we are in the early stages of ... [a} far-reaching revolution [that] is
being driven by people and enabled by social media").
I 0. See Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance ofJustification Standards,
94 MINN. L. REV. 1514, 1556 (2010).
II.
See Steve Lohr, Microsoft to Allow Partners to Alter Some Source Code, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10,
2003 ), http :1/www .nytimes.com/2003/04/ 10/business/technology-microsoft-to-allow-partners-to-alter-somesource-code.html ("Steady advances in chip speeds and miniaturization have enabled manufacturers to begin
putting more computing power in smaller devices."); Jacob Livingston, Mixed Messages: Educators Blame
Students ' Errors on Texting Lingo, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Nov. 15, 2009), http://www. spokesman.com/stories
/2009/nov/15/mixed-messages/ (noting that "the percentage of the U.S. population who are always connected
has skyrocketed" and reporting on a Nielsen Company survey that found "77 percent of[Arnerican} teenagers
have their own mobile phones and more than 80 percent of those teens use text messaging" and that "[d]uring
the first quarter of2009, American teens sent or received an average of2,899 text messages per month-an
increase of 566 percent in just over two years").
12. See Mike Snider, Phone Buyers Getting Smarter, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2012), at 1B .
13. "CLAB" is Internet slang for "[c]rying like a baby." Randi Bjornstad, Ruth Retiring? OMG!:
Secondhand Shop Owner May Hang It Up at Year's End, REG.-GUARD (Sept. 12, 2010), http ://projects.
registerguard .com/turin/201 0/sep/12/ruth-retiring-omg/. But cf FED. R. EVID. 801 (a) (defming hearsay as an
assertion of "a person"). A version of this joke appeared in a footnote of an earlier article. See Bellin,
Present Sense Impressions, supra note 4, at 355 n.88. I continue to fmd it amusing.
14. See Bellin, Present Sense Impressions, supra note 4, at 352.
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communicate with large audiences of "friends" or "followers," on traditional
15
computers as well as mobile devices such as smartphones.
Without a steady stream of user-provided content, sites such as Facebook
and Twitter would be empty shells. Accordingly, these sites "are constantly
trying to get more [content], inviting [users] to update, upload, post and
publish. " 16 These efforts have been successful. Facebook boasts more than
1 billion users, and an average of 552 million daily active users. 17 Twitter
reports a steadily increasing average of over 200 million "[t]weets" per day. 18
Recent surveys illustrate the trend toward a world in which we all send
and receive a constant stream of electronic communication. Seventy-eight
percent of adults use the Internet, at least occasionally. 19 Among online adults,
two-thirds (66%) use "social media platforms" like Facebook and Twitter,20
generating "open running diaries" of their lives. 21 Cell phones, once a novelty,
are now the norm, but talking on the phone is increasingly optional. The vast
majority (83%) of American adults own cell phones, and almost three-quarters
of them (73%) use their phones for texting. 22 Among adults, those who use text
messaging "send or receive an average of 41.5 messages on a typical day, with
the median user sending or receiving 10 texts daily.'m As more Americans
15. See About Twitter, TWIITER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Oct. 18, 2012) (explaining
Twitter's service); Virginia Heffernan, The Medium : Being There, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. I 0, 2009), http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/02115/magazine/15wwln-medium-t.html?_r=O (reporting that the capability of mobile
devices to access social networking sites "has made it more likely that when a pal-the Jagermeister-besotted
Sean, say-writes that he's stumbling home, he is stumbling home, right then, and simultaneously apprising
his friends via his mobile"); Dhiraj Murthy, Twitter: Microphone for the Masses?, 33 MEDIA, CULTURE &
Soc'y 779,781 (2011) (describing how Twitter works).
·
16. See MATI IVESTER, LOL ... OMG!: WHAT EVERY STUDENT NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT ONLINE
REPUTATION MANAGEMENT, DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP AND CYBERBULLYING 17-18 (2011) (noting that "the
average Facebook user posts ninety pieces of content on the site every month" and emphasizing that social
media sites need content to survive and so "they are constantly trying to get more of it, inviting you to update,
upload, post and publish").
17. Newsroom: Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreald=22
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
18. Your World, More Connected, TwiTTER BLOG (Aug. I, 2011, 9:25AM), http://blog.twitter.com/
2011/08/your-world-more-connected.html (reponing that Twitter generates over 200 million tweets per day, up
from 65 million tweets per day in 20 I 0).
19. LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET AS A DIVERSION AND
DESTINATION 6 (20 II), available at http://pewintemet.org/-/mediai/Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Logging-Qn-forfun.pdf.
20. AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, WHY AMERICANS USE SOCIAL MEDIA 2
(2011), available at http://pewintemet.org/-/mediai/Files/Reports/2011/Why%20Americans%20Use%20
Social%20Media.pdf.
21. See QUALMAN, supra note 9, at 4.
22. AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, AMERICANS AND THEIR CELL PHONES 2
(2011) (hereinafter SMITH, AMERICANS AND THEIR CELL PHONES), available at http://pewintemet.
org/-/mediai/Files/Reports/2011/Cell%20Phones%2020ll.pdf; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (citing a June 2011 report that "there were more than 322 million
wireless devices in use in the United States").
23 . AARON SMITH, PEW ll--.'TERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, AMERICANS AND TEXT MESSAGING 1, 2
(2011), available at http://pewintemet.orgl-/mediai/Files!Reports/2011/Americans%20and%20Text%20
Messaging.pdf.
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move to smartphones---devices that make texting easier-these numbers will
only increase. In addition, skyrocketing technology usage rates among younger
generations foreshadow a not-so-distant future where everybody is plugged into
the Internet, everybody uses social media, and everybody texts-all the time. 24
The ubiquity of electronic communication is only part of the equation.
There are two facets of this new communication norm that make it particularly
significant for litigation. First, electronic communications are more likely to
become known to and retrievable by interested litigants? 5 E-communications
are more public than the oral and written communications of an earlier era;
these utterances quickly spread to numerous recipients and, in doing so, pass
through and become preserved on the computers involved in their transmission
and receipt. 26 Police and prosecutors can root out this electronic evidence with
an Internet search or subpoena to Facebook, Twitter, or the cellphone service
providers of the suspect and his friends. 27 Second, electronic communications
are powerful evidence because they will be (or at least appear to be) preserved
in their original form. 28 Memories fade, and witnesses lose interest or develop a
bias at the time of trial. Electronic communications, however, sent in an
unguarded moment to friends or acquaintances remain pristine. Often arising
before the controversy, these statements may be viewed by juries as more
reliable than in-court testimony because they were uttered closer in time to a
disputed event and more incriminating because some witnesses may seem more
candid when speaking to friends than testifying in court.
24. See, e.g., SMITH, AMERICANS AND THEIR CELL PHONES, supra note 22, at 6. For example, while
95% of eighteen to twenty-nine-year-olds with cell phones text, the number drops to 24% for those over sixtyfour. !d.; see also Joanna Brenner, Pew Internet: Mobile, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (Sept. 4,
20 12), http://pewintemet.org/Commentary/20 12/February/Pew-lntemet-Mobile.aspx ("Cell owners between
the ages of 18 and 24 exchange an average ofl09.5 messages on a normal day-that works out to more than
3,200 texts per month-and the typical or median cell owner in this age group sends or receives 50 messages
per day (or 1500 messages per month)."); AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT,
TEENS, KiNDNESS AND CRUELTY ON SOCIAL NETWORK SITES 15 (2011), available at http://pewintemet.
org/-/media//Files/Reports/20 11/PIP_Teens_Kindness_Cruelty_SNS_Report_Nov_20 11_FINAL_11 0711.pdf
("Internet use is nearly universal among American teens.").
25. See Ohm, supra note 10, at 1556.
26. See id. (explaining that a key distinction between a "Facebook status update" and the casual
utterances these status updates replace is that, unlike the stray "utterances that once floated through the air and
then disappeared without a trace," status updates are "not only ... stored, but also they are accessible by a
company that is not a party to the conversations"); see also Seth P. Berman eta!., Web 2. 0: What's Evidence
Between "Friends"?, 53 Bos. B.J. 5, 5-6 (Jan.-Feb. 2009) (advising litigators that discoverable Facebook
postings can be obtained either from the computers of participants in the conversation or "from Facebook
itself'); Daniel de Vise, Schoolyard Face-Offs Blamed on Facebook Taunts, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2008),
http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/26/AR200804260 1286.htrnl (noting that
Facebook comments are "now immortalized on semi-public Web pages, where they can be viewed by
thousands"); Jacob Leibenluft, Do Text Messages Live Forever?, SLATE (May 1, 2008, 6:15
PM), http://www .slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/05/do_text_messages_live_forever .html
(discussing the possibility that, depending on one's cell phone service provider, even deleted text messages
can be recovered from one's phone, but noting that some providers delete text messages fairly rapidly).
27. See Jeff Bellin, Finding Evidence on Facebook, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (Nov. I, 2011),
http://lawprofessors. typepad.com/evidenceprof/20 11/11 /fmding-evidence-on-facebook.html.
28. See Leibenluft, supra note 26.
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APPLYING CRAWFORD'S CONFRONTATION RIGHT TO DIGITAL
COMMUNICATION

As litigators (and police investigators) become more and more attuned to
the digital evidentiary cornucopia swirling in cyberspace, the application of the
Confrontation Clause to electronic statements becomes increasingly important.
As more and more communication migrates onto electronic platforms,
defendant-incriminating statements will be made on these platforms in
unguarded moments by witnesses (such as defendants' friends or partners in
crime) who would likely refuse to testify or be impossible to locate. These
witnesses are ordinarily useless to the prosecution, but their hearsay could be
priceless. Prosecutors ofthe future may have placards in their office that read,
"Who needs informants, when there is Facebook?" Assuming an applicable
hearsay exception, Facebook commentary is, in fact, tactically superior to
informant testimony because it can "testify" without damaging crossexamination.
As discussed below, the recent revitalization of the Confrontation Clause
actually decreases the constitutional protections that apply to many electronic
out-of-court statements. While an accomplice's statement during a police
interrogation is now inadmissible absent confrontation, the same statement on a
Facebook page or in a text message can be admitted without any Confrontation
Clause scrutiny at all. 29
Prior to 2004, Confrontation Clause analysis was governed by Ohio v.
30
Roberts.
As it came to be interpreted, Roberts condoned the admission of
any hearsay exhibiting "indicia ofreliability."31 Under Roberts, a judge could
-consistent with the Sixth Amendment-admit a hearsay accusation without
confrontation, so long as the statement fell within a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception or otherwise appeared trustworthy. 32 Crawford famously overturned
Roberts, rejecting the significance under the Sixth Amendment of a judicial
determination of an out-of-court statement's reliability. 33 Under Crawford,
whether an out-of-court statement implicates the Confrontation Clause depends
on the manner in which the statement arose-i.e., the statement's "primary
purpose."34 If a statement is made or elicited primarily with an eye toward
litigation, it is testimonial and with very limited exceptions inadmissible, absent
29. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
30. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004).
31. /d. (holding !hat unconfronted hearsay offered by !he prosecution "is admissible only if it bears
adequate 'indicia of reliability"'). Roberts itself could be read to also require a showing of unavailability, but
!hat reading of !he case was later rejected. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353 (1992).
32. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (holding !hat !he prosecution can establish !he requisite reliability eiiher by
showing "particularized guarantees" of a statement's "trustworihiness" or by showing !hat !he statement "falls
wiihin a firmly rooted hearsay exception").
33. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
34. /d. at 52 ("Where testimonial statements are at issue, !he only indicium of reliability sufficient to
satis(y constitutional demands is !he one !he Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.").
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confrontation, against the defendant in a criminal trial. 35 Thus, with respect to
testimonial hearsay, Crawford significantly strengthens the Confrontation
Clause.
A statement is not testimonial if it is made or elicited with a primary
36
purpose other than to create "an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony."
After Crawford (and more precisely, Davis), nontestimonial statements no
longer implicate the Confrontation Clause.37 This is true regardless of
reliability. 38 Thus, with respect to non testimonial hearsay, Crawford weakened
Confrontation Clause protection. 39 Prior to Crawford, nontestimonial hearsay,
like all hearsay admitted against a criminal defendant, had to exhibit "indicia of
reliability'' to be admissible absent confrontation. 40 After Crawford (and
Davis), even that minimal hurdle is removed.
Modem Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, thus, hinges on the definition
of "testimonial" and the application of that term in various contexts. With
respect to electronic utterances, this is not a positive development for
proponents of a robust Confrontation Clause. 41 Although the guidance is
sparse, what we know so far indicates that the increasingly common electronic
42
utterances of everyday life will almost always be nontestimonial.
The Court has so far defined "testimonial" largely in the context of cases
considering statements elicited during police questioning or, what the Court
calls, "colloquial [ly], " "interrogation. '.43 The Court analyzes the purpose of any
such statement by distinguishing between whether an inquiring police officer is
acting as a "first responder" or "criminal investigator.'M Statements obtained
by an officer acting as a first responder (e.g., responding to an "ongoing

35. !d. Crawford declined to articulate a precise defmition of testimonial. See id. at 68~9. The Court's
most recent guidance is reflected above. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (201l)(explaining that
"when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony," the "admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the
Confrontation Clause").
36. Bryant, 13 I S. Ct. at 1155.
37. !d.; Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419-20 (2007) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause has no
application to [non testimonial] statements and therefore permits their admission even if they lack indicia of
reliability."); Robert P. Mosteller, Giles v. California: Avoiding Serious Damage to Crawford 's Limited
Revolution, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675, 679 (2009) ("Even though an incriminating, unconfronted
statement is offered to convict the defendant, it is not covered at all by the Confrontation Clause unless the
statement is deemed testimonial.").
38. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 72.
39. See id.
40. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)),
abrogated by Crawford, 541 U .S. 36.
41. See Crawford, 541 U.S . at 54-64.
42. See, e.g. , Davis, 547 U.S. at 831-34.
43 . See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4 (emphasizing that "[w]e use the term ' interrogation ' in its
colloquial, rather than any technical[,]legal[] sense").
44. Michigan v. Bryant, 13 I S. Ct. 1143, 1161 (2011).
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emergency'') fall into the nontestimonial category;45 statements obtained by an
officer acting in an investigative capacity are testimonial. 46
As the case law evolved, it became clear that the oft-cited "ongoingemergency'' purpose of police questioning has no inherent significance other
than that it is not (primarily) an investigative purpose. The Court explained in
Bryant that statements elicited or made with any purpose other than to "create a
record for trial" are nontestimonial. 47 Bryant states,
When, as in Davis, the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond to an
"ongoing emergency," its purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is
not within the scope of the Clause. But there may be other circumstances,
aside from ongoing emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a
primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony ....
Where no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility of a statement is the
48
concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.

Although it is certainly possible that the Court will change course in the
future, the thrust of its opinions thus far is that the analysis in the police
interrogation context maps directly onto hearsay statements that arise in other
contexts. The Court emphasized, for example, in Davis that its framing of the
testimonial-nontestimonial analysis in an interrogation context was solely a
consequence of the facts of the case before it. 49 The Court noted that "[t]he
Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered
testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt
answers to detailed interrogation" and that "[p]art of the evidence against Sir
Walter Raleigh was a letter from Lord Cobham that was plainly not the result of
sustained questioning. " 50
The conclusion seems unavoidable, then, that volunteered statements and
statements elicited by friends and associates (as opposed to law enforcement
authorities) will be measured by the same "primary purpose" analysis described
in Bryant. 51 Statements uttered or elicited to "create a record for trial" are
45. See, e.g., Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1148-49; Davis, 547 U.S. at 814.
46. See, e.g., Davis, 547 U.S . at 814-15; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
47. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155.
48. /d. Justice Ginsburg proposed an all-purpose defmition of testimonial in Bullcoming: "To rank as
'testimonial,' a statement must have a 'primary purpose' of 'establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution."' Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2714 n.6 (2011)
(quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). It does not appear that Justice Ginsburg sought to alter the definition
applied in Bryant, as the footnote cited the portion of Bryant quoted in the text as authority for the defmition.
/d. (citing Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155). In any event, only three Justices joined the footnote where the
defmition appeared, leaving the defmition in Bryant as the authoritative defmition going forward. /d.
49. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 n.J.
50. !d.
5 I. Cf Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S . 305, 315-16 (2009) (analyzing the primary purpose
of an out-of-court statement obtained outside of police interrogation context); Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717
(similarly deeming a chemist certificate testimonial); Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2720 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) ("[F]or the reasons the Court sets forth the BAC report and Caylor's certification on it clearly
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testimonial and inadmissible absent confrontation; statements uttered or elicited
for all other purposes are nontestimonial and trigger no Confrontation Clause
scrutiny whatsoever. 52 Given this framework, few electronic statements
(tweets, texts, or even emails) will be deemed testimonial.
Supreme Court dicta are thus far consistent with this conclusion. In
Crawford, the Court explained that "testimony" is "typically '[a] solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
53
fact. "' The Court highlighted "casual remark[s] to an acquaintance" and "offhand, overheard remark[s]" as examples of out-of-court statements that would
be nontestimonial. 54 In Giles v. California, the Court similarly noted that
"[s]tatements to friends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation ... would
be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules. " 55 The dicta from Giles (quoted
with approval in Bryant) speaks volumes. 56 In the universe of informal
statements, statements about "abuse and intimidation" would be among the
most likely to be of foreseeable interest in litigation (specifically, a criminal
trial of the abuser). 57 Yet, the Court strongly suggests that unless the declarant
(viewed as an objective matter) intends for her statement to be used in
litigation, such statements are non testimonial. 58
Putting together the Court's scattered pronouncements and its underlying
analysis, the significance of the testimonial-nontestimonial dichotomy for
electronic communications is plain. Electronic communications-texts, status
updates, tweets, and the like-will rarely be made "with a primary purpose of
creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony."59 As a consequence, it is
difficult to envision the new Confrontation Clause applying with any regularity
to the informal electronic communications that will increasingly dominate our

have a 'primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.'" (quoting Bryant, 562 S. Ct
at 1155)).
52. Cf Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("[T]his is not a case in which the
State suggested an alternate purpose, much less an alternate primary purpose, for the BAC report.").
53. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S . 36, 51 (2004) (citing 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S. Converse 1828)); see also Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at
II 55 ("[T]he most important instances in which the Clause restricts the introduction of out-of-court
statements are those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to
obtain evidence for trial.").
54. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
55. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008).
56. See id.; see also Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 n.9 (quoting, with approval, the dicta from Giles).
57. See Giles, 544 U.S. at 376.
58. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168.
59. See id. at 1155, 1168; State v. Damper, 225 P.3d 1148, 1151 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (rejecting a
Confrontation Clause challenge to a text message because the message was nontestimonial); Hape v. State,
903 N .E.2d 977,989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the Confrontation Clause did not bar the introduction
of a text message because it was not testimonial); Berman, supra note 26, at 6 (noting that postings on social
networks "tend to mimic casual spoken conversation rather than formal, written communication"); cf People
v. Herrera, No. 05-208, 2006 WL 758544, at *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 22, 2006). Among electronic
communications, it is most likely that email would be created for purposes of litigation, but most email will
not fit that description. See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 335 App'x 324, 328 (4th Cir. 2009).
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discourse. Whenever malleable hearsay rules oblige, prosecutors will be able to
introduce electronic utterances of absent witnesses to prove a defendant's guilt.

N. HOW DID IT COME TO THIS? TEXTIJAL AND HISTORICAL TREATMENT
OF NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY

Those disappointed by the realization that the admission of the electronic
discourse of the future will be largely unregulated by modem Confrontation
Clause doctrine may be cheered to know that neither the text nor history of the
Sixth Amendment dictates this result. Crawford's exclusion of nontestimonial
hearsay-and, thus, the bulk of informal, social communication-from the
Confrontation Clause' s reach depends on an unpersuasive analysis of the text
and history of the Sixth Amendment. In fact, given how significant the Court's
exclusion of non testimonial hearsay from the scope of the Confrontation Clause
is for the future, it is striking how cursory (and flawed) the Court's textual and
historical analysis is on this point. Perhaps most surprising is the absence of
dissent.
The Court first announced that nontestimonial hearsay fell outside the
scope of the Confrontation Clause in Davis. 60 Only one Justice (Justice
Thomas) did not join the majority opinion in Davis, and his disagreement was
not that the Court's definition of witnesses was too narrow (i.e., that it excluded
nontestimonial statements), but that it was not narrow enough (i.e., that more
hearsay should be deemed non testimonial and, thus, placed outside the scope of
the Confrontation Clause).61 Although serious fault lines have emerged in
subsequent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, those fault lines do not include
any Justice taking the position that nontestimonial hearsay triggers
Confrontation Clause protection. 62
The Court's conclusion that nontestimonial hearsay receives no
Confrontation Clause protection hinges on two prongs: one prong is textual and
the other historical. 63 Both prongs are seriously flawed. Space precludes
setting forth the complete argument-which has been made elsewhere-but a
brief summary should suffice. 64 As a textual matter, there is no reason to
60. Davis, 547 U.S. at 824 ("A limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision
must fairly be said to mark out not merely its 'core, ' but its perimeter."); see also id. at 821 ("Only statements
of this sort [i.e., testimonial statements] cause the declarant to be a 'witness' within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause. It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that,
while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause."
(citations omitted)). Bryant glosses over Davis's role in this evolution, suggesting erroneously that Crawford,
not Davis, "limited the Confrontation Clause's reach to testimonial statements." See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at
1153. The Court makes this same error inBockting. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549U.S. 406, 413-14 (2007).
61. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 835 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
62. Seeid. at813 .
63. !d. at 822.
64. See, e.g. , Jeffi'ey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013) (manuscript at 13) [hereinafter Bellin, Shrinking Confrontation Clause], available at httpJ/papers.ssm.
corn/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstract_id=l956748; Randolph N . Jonakait, "Witnesses " in the Confrontation Clause:
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conclude, as the Court does, that the term witnesses in the Sixth Amendment is
limited to persons who speak "with a primary purpose of creating an out-ofcourt substitute for trial testimony."65 The Court relies on the fifth definition of
"witnesses" in Noah Webster's 1828 dictionary ("those who 'bear testimony"')
to reach this conclusion,66 but even accepting this methodological approach to
constitutional interpretation, Webster's dictionary includes a third definition
("[a] person who knows or sees any thing")67 that sweeps more broadly, and the
68
Court has never explained why this definition does not also apply.
The Court's historical argument is similarly unavailing. The Court asserts
that it cannot locate any "early American case[s]" in which courts excluded
unconfronted, nontestimonial hearsay. 69 Strangely, one such case clearly
exists-and was mentioned by both the majority and dissent in Crawford (but
ignored in Davis): an 1807 opinion of Chief Justice Marshall presiding at the
treason trial of Aaron Burr. 7 Further, treatise writers of the Framing era
expressed what appears to be a consensus view that the admission ofhearsay of
any stripe created tension with the common law confrontation right. 71 If there
was any Framing-era consensus, it was the opposite of the one the Court found:
the prosecution could not-at least officially-rely on any hearsay
72
(nontestimonial or otherwise) to prove a criminal defendant's guilt.

°

V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
If, as I and others have argued, the Court's critical conclusion-that the
introduction of nontestimonial hearsay does not implicate the Confrontation
Clause-flows from an erroneous textual and historical analysis, there is
obviously room for the doctrine to progress in another direction. There are
three alternate approaches that the Supreme Court could adopt to expand
Crawford v. Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155, 157 (2006);
Thomas Y. Davies, Not "The Framers' Design": How the Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence
Refotes the Crawford-Davis "Testimonial" Formulation ofthe Scope ofthe Original Confrontation Clause,
15 J .L. & POL 'y 349 (2007).
65. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155.
66. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004); 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S. Converse 1828).
67. WEBSTER, supra note 66; accord Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
68. See Bellin, Shrinking Confrontation Clause, supra note 64 (manuscript at 17-18).
69. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 (2006) ("We are not aware of any early American case
invoking the Confrontation Clause or the common-law right to confrontation that did not clearly involve
[testimonial statements].").
70. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (excluding a
nontestimonial statement of a coconspirator from the trial and stating, "I know not why ... a man should have
a constitutional claim to be confronted with the witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations, made in his
absence, may be evidence against him").
71. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 64, at 350.
72. Bellin, Shrinking Confrontation Clause, supra note 64 (manuscript at 26); Davies, supra note 64, at
380-81; see also David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay's Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5 (noting that the
hearsay doctrine in the eighteenth century was "less developed" than its modern day counterpart).
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Confrontation Clause protection to informal, electronic utterances. Each is
discussed briefly below.

A. Redefine "Testimonial"
As noted above, the absence of Confrontation Clause restrictions on
electronic utterances is a function of two doctrinal developments: ( 1) the
Court's limiting of Confrontation Clause protection to testimonial hearsay and
(2) its narrow definition of testimonial. One way to change the Confrontation
Clause treatment of electronic utterances is to target the latter development and
expand the definition of "testimonial."
Indeed, even accepting the Court's focus on the fifth ofNoah Webster's
definitions of"witness," Bryant's narrow definition of"testimonial" hearsaystatements "procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court
substitute for trial testimony"-is not inescapable. 73 Crawford itself posited as
one potential definition of "testimonial," "statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial."74 Under this (never
adopted) definition, many electronic communications, including casual social
statements, could be deemed testimonial. While the people who utter
statements via Twitter, Facebook, texts, or emails rarely intend that their
statements will be used in litigation, they will often (objectively viewed)
"reasonably ... believe" in, or recognize, that possibility. 75 Other definitions of
testimonial, including a more functional definition that focuses on how the
statement is used at trial, rather than on how the statement came into being,
would accomplish a similar goal: exposing more informal communication to
Confrontation Clause scrutiny, including electronic utterances. 76
Although altering the definition of testimonial may be the least disruptive
way to fold electronic utterances into existing Confrontation Clause doctrine, it
is not an ideal solution. As I argue elsewhere, the Bryant Court's definition of
testimonial provides a clean line demarcating a single category of hearsay
whose admission most offends the Confrontation Clause. 77 Statements created
73. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011 ).
74. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52; cf Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (proposing a similar
definition). Richard Friedman proposed a similar defmition, statements that are made "with the anticipation
that, in all likelihood, the statement will be presented to the factfinder at trial." Richard D. Friedman,
Cmifrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. lOll, 1039 (1998).
75. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added).
76. See Michael D. Cicchini & Vincent Rust, Confrontation After Crawford v. Washington: Defining
"Testimonial," 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 531, 543 (2006) (arguing that the "term testimonial should be
defined as all accusatory hearsay, i.e., hearsay that tends to establish in any way an element of the crime or the
identification of the defendant"); Josephine Ross, After Crawford Double-Speak: "Testimony" Does Not
Mean Testimony and "Witness" Does Not Mean Witness, 97 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 147, 193 (2006)
(proposing that the Court "adopt[] a functional approach to the term testimonial [that considers] whether the
evidence functioned as testimony against the accused at the trial").
77. Bellin, Shrinking Confrontation Clause, supra note 64 (manuscript at 4).
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with an eye toward litigation are qualitatively different from all others, and the
reason they must be forbidden absent confrontation is plain. If such statements
were allowed, the defendant's basic right to cross-examination could easily be
subverted through simple expedients such as affidavits and videotaped
examinations.78 This was, after all, the powerful critique launched by scholars
like Richard Friedman and Akhil Amar, which ultimately foretold Roberts's
demise.79 If the stark prohibition of testimonial hearsay is tethered to this
functional argument, it makes sense both on policy and interpretive grounds.
The government cannot obtain statements from witnesses (e.g., affidavits or
videotaped examinations) and use those statements at trial in lieu of live
witnesses to prove the defendant's guilt. 80 Permitting such practices would
render the confrontation right a nullity-clearly bad policy and a poor
interpretation of the constitutional text. Thus, Bryant provides a useful
definition of a minimal, core class of testimonial statements that cannot be
admitted without confrontation (although, as explained above, the Court's
explanation for how it arrived at the definition is seriously flawed). 81
Broadening the term-"testimonial" beyond the narrow contours
articulated in Bryant creates difficult line drawing problems. Relatedly, by
untethering the testimonial label from the functional rationale described above,
this approach would enhance the specter of illegitimacy. Crawford's
testimonial-nontestimonial dichotomy is itself novel, and further expanding the
definition of"testimonial" will only increase the strain on its pseudo textual and
historical roots. 82 At least while alternative doctrinal approaches remain
plausible, the definition of testimonial should be left where it lies after Bryant,
and the functional rationale sketched in the preceding paragraph substituted for
the textual-historical analysis relied on by the Court.
In summary, broadening the definition of testimonial may be a plausible
mechanism to place e-hearsay within the Confrontation Clause. But it is, in my
view, unconvincing as an interpretive approach to the Sixth Amendment. A
broader definition of testimonial would certainly capture more electronic
statements, but it would untether the critical term "testimonial" from its already
tenuous connection to the Sixth Amendment text and history, with predictably
bad consequences for the doctrine's legitimacy and longevity.

78. See id. (manuscript at 34, 10).
79. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 129
(1997); Friedman, supra note 74, at 1025-26.
80. See Bellin, Shrinking Confrontation Clause, supra note 64 (manuscript at 28-29).
81 . See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166-67 (2011).
82. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69-70 (2004).
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B. Extending Corifrontation Clause Protection to Nontestimonial
Statements

Assuming that the definition of"testimonial" remains narrowly drawn as
in Bryant, the next potential doctrinal approach to limiting the admission of
electronic utterances under the Confrontation Clause is to expand Confrontation
Clause protections to nontestimonial hearsay. This solution becomes
particularly attractive (and may be required as an interpretive manner) once the
Court's flawed claim to have located an explicit textual source for the
nontestimonial-testimonial dichotomy is exposed. 83
Most commentators, and the Court itself, seem to agree that applying the
strict post-Crawford limits on testimonial hearsay to all hearsay would be a step
too far. As the Roberts Court recognized, interpreting "the Clause [to] abrogate
virtually every hearsay exception" is "a result long rejected as unintended and
too extreme."84 Constitutional protections can be applied to nontestimonial
hearsay, however, without those protections reaching the level necessary to
regulate the admission of testimonial hearsay. As noted above, testimonial
hearsay (as that category is defined in Bryant) must be prohibited absent
confrontation so that the prosecution cannot extinguish the defendant's most
basic right to cross-examination through simple expedients like affidavits and
videotaped examinations. This proposition is supported by both the Court's
historical analysis in Crawford and the functional analysis described in the
preceding section. 85 The admission of nontestimonial hearsay is not as
powerful an affront to the confrontation right and, thus, can be restricted less
severely.
One approach to limiting nontestimonial hearsay is to apply Roberts's
reliability analysis to such statements. At least one prominent scholar has
suggested this approach, 86 and some state courts already follow suit. 87 A
Roberts-esque indicia of reliability test would certainly prevent the admission
of some electronic utterances. 88 Electronic utterances are often painfully
informal, ambiguous, error ridden, and can easily be uttered anonymously or
with false attribution. 89 One obvious flaw of Roberts in this regard, however,
was that it permitted an artificial shortcut to a finding of reliability. Under
Roberts, sufficient indicia of reliability existed-as a matter of law-with

83. See supra Part II.
84. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
85. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-53; supra Part ill.
86. Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation as Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Crawford's Birth Did
Not Require that Roberts Had to Die, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 685, 722 (2007) (advocating reviving Roberts to
provide "weaker" constitutional protections for "problematic," but not testimonial, hearsay).
87. See, e.g., Sharifi v. State, 993 So. 2d 907, 930 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (suggesting that the Roberts
era analysis continues to apply to nontestimonial hearsay); State v. Fields, 168 P.3d 955, 968 (Haw. 2007)
(applying Hawaii 's Constitution).
88. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
89. Bellin, Shrinking Confrontation Clause, supra note 64 (manuscript at 12-15).
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respect to any hearsay admitted under a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception. 90
Even assuming this "loophole" remains, a Roberts screen might still exclude a
significant amount of electronic evidence, particularly e-hearsay offered under
not-so-firmly rooted exceptions, such as the catch-all (residual) exceptions,
modem exceptions for child-victim statements and the exception for present
sense impressions. 91
Another approach to applying less restrictive constitutional limits on the
admission of nontestimonial hearsay is an unavailability requirement. 92 This
limit would permit nontestimonial hearsay of absent witnesses only after a
showing that the witness could not be brought to trial. An unavailability
requirement appears with some regularity in both the history of the AngloAmerican confrontation right as well as the Supreme Court's Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence.93 The requirement enforced a traditional "preference" for
live testimony over hearsay-a preference that few would contend is not
captured in some form in the Sixth Amendment confrontation right. An
unavailability requirement (with exceptions for certain uncontroversial business
and public records) would require the prosecution to choose live witness
testimony, and not hearsay, whenever such a choice existed. For this
approach-an approach with some promise-to work, courts must strictly
enforce the requirement of unavailability to prevent prosecutorial
gamesmanship. 94

C. A Role for Due Process?
A final possibility for limiting the admissibility of nontestimonial,
electronic utterances under the modem interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause is through a separate constitutional provision, the right to "due process."
Indeed, Bryant asserts in a footnote that a new form of constitutional protection
rooted in the Due Process Clause "may" arise to address nontestimonial
90. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 ("Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.").
91. Bellin, Present Sense Impressions, supra note 4, at 358.
92. See State v. Moore, 49 P.3d 785, 792 (Or. 2002) (applying Oregon's Constitution); Bellin, Shrinking
Confrontation Clause, supra note 64 (manuscript at 34-3 7); Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation
After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 307 (2006) [hereinafter Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation]
(advocating that legislatures amend hearsay rules to require prosecutors to make a showing of unavailability
prior to introducing nontestimonial hearsay); Tom Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There Is a Confrontation Clause,
71 BROOK. L. REv. 401,406 (2005) [hereinafter Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There Is a Confrontation Clause]
(citing Oregon courts' requirement of unavailability as an "attractive alternative" to the Supreme Court's
abandonment of Confrontation Clause protection for nontestirnonial hearsay) ("This requirement helps to
avoid the gamesmanship of the pre-Crawford era, when prosecutors called police to recount victims' hearsay
statements even when the victims were available to testify.").
93. Bellin, Shrinking Confrontation Clause, supra note 64 (manuscript at 7-13); Graham C. Lilly, Notes
on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 207,212-15 (1984) (explaining that
while the eighteenth century "Anglo-American decisions" are not "totally harmonious, a prevailing principle
threads throughout them: if the declarant was living and could be produced, he must appear at trial").
94. See Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There Is a Confrontation Clause, supra note 92, at 406.
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hearsay. 95 Whether the Court will truly follow through on erecting due process
protections in this context is questionable. The Court's 8-1 ruling in the 2012
case of Perry v. New Hampshire suggests that the Court has no intention of
employing the Due Process Clause to police the admission of unreliable, out-ofcourt statements.96 In Perry, the Court roundly rejected a due process challenge
to the admission of an eyewitness's out-of-court identification of a car burglary
97
suspect. The Court placed its ruling in a larger context, stating "[w]e have
concluded in other contexts, . .. that the potential unreliability of a type of
evidence does not alone render its introduction at the defendant's trial
fUndamentally unfair. " 98
The Court's reluctance to erect a due process-based limit on the
admissibility of evidence is understandable. It is difficult to imagine precisely
what contours such a rule might possess and the sources of authority from
which to craft those contours. More likely, the Court will continue, as it did in
Perry, to leave the assessment of the reliability of otherwise admissible
evidence to juries and, absent governrnent malfeasance (generally lacking in the
creation ofnontestimonial hearsay), eliminate constitutional restrictions in this
context. Due process protections will, of course, continue to play a role in
assessing the overall "fairness" of a criminal trial. At the extremes, the unfair
admission of unreliable and unconfronted statements (like the admission of any
questionable incriminating evidence or exclusion of favorable evidence) may
tip the balance in an otherwise problematic trial. But, that is likely all Bryant is
saying in this context, and it is nothing new. 99
VI. CONCLUSION
A vast, and increasing, portion of our discourse takes place in an informal
manner in a digital medium. This discourse, while readily susceptible for use at
trial, is left largely unrestricted by the post-Crawford Confrontation Clause. It
is possible that any dangers this conclusion might foretell can be addressed
95 . See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1162 n.13 (20li)("(T]he Due Process Clause .. . may
constitute a further bar to admission of, for example, unreliable evidence."). A similar provision exists in the
English Criminal Justice Act of2003 § 125 (requiring trial court to dismiss cases in which hearsay evidence is
so central to a case against the defendant that a conviction would be suspect).
96. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012).
97. ld.
98. Jd. at 728 (emphasis added).
99. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 53 (1996) (noting that "erroneous evidentiary rulings can, in
combination, rise to the level of a due process violation"); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96-97 (1970)
(Harlan, J. , concurring) (arguing that constitutional limits on hearsay are "far more appropriately performed
under the aegis of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' commands that federal and state trials, respectively,
must be conducted in accordance with due process of law"); see also Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143,
1162 n. l3 (20II)(citing the above cases on this point). But see United States v. LeMay, 260F.3d 1018, 1027
(9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the due process challenge to FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 414 and explaining that
'" [a]pplication of Rule 403 .. . should always result in the exclusion of evidence' that is so prejudicial as to
deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial" (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Castillo, 140
F.3d 874, 883 (lOth Cir. 1998))).
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through hearsay rules, and not the Confrontation Clause. 100 State and federal
hearsay rules can certainly limit the admissibility of unreliable out-of-court
statements, including electronic statements. 101 There is no guarantee that this
will happen, however, and legislators may, in fact, move in the opposite
direction-taking advantage of the newfound constitutional flexibility with
respect to the admission ofnontestimonial hearsay. With such freedom, and to
a significant extent even under existing law, prosecutors can introduce out-ofcourt statements from social media sources, as well as text messages and email,
and rely on these cyber-accusations, in lieu of live witnesses, to establish a
defendant's guilt. 102 One can hear the echoes of Sir Walter Raleigh's
protestations (on Twitter) now:

SirWalter @CJPopham what proof is this against me but the sayings of
some mad tweeter? #massacred-by-hearsay
CJPopham nay @SirWalter incrimination on social media is strongest of
all proofs and, under Crawford, admissible to boot #guilty-as-charged 103

100. See DEAN WIGMORE, 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE§ 1397, at 158 (Chadbourn ed. 1974). Dean
Wigmore long ago emphasized that the hearsay rules address the same concerns that animate the
Confrontation Clause. See id.
101. See Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation, supra note 92, at 307.
102. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
103. The exchange that follows is loosely paraphrased from DAVJD JARDINE, Trial ofSir Walter Raleigh,
in l CRIMINAL TRIALS 400, 420, 428-29 ( 1832).
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